- 8
- 2
Mostapha Diss
10
Documents
Affiliations actuelles
- 106420
- 1073157
Identifiants chercheurs
- mostapha-diss
- IdRef : 145099202
- 0000-0003-2070-5801
- Google Scholar : https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=96e426sAAAAJ&hl=fr
Domaines de recherche
Publications
- 4
- 4
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 2
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 10
- 5
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 7
- 3
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 2
- 1
- 4
- 2
|
On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules2024
Pré-publication, Document de travail
hal-04390700v1
|
|
The effect of close elections on the likelihood of voting paradoxes: Further results in three-candidate elections2023
Pré-publication, Document de travail
hal-04230359v1
|
|
Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule2020
Pré-publication, Document de travail
hal-04543260v1
|
|
Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule2020
Pré-publication, Document de travail
hal-02554924v1
|
|
The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency2018
Pré-publication, Document de travail
hal-01757761v1
|
|
Social unacceptability for simple voting proceduresSpringer, Cham. Advances in Collective Decision Making, pp.25-42, 2023, Studies in Choice and Welfare, 978-3-031-21695-4. ⟨10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_3⟩
Chapitre d'ouvrage
hal-03614587v1
|
|
Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstentionSpringer. Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, pp.55-73, 2021, Studies in Choice and Welfare, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_3⟩
Chapitre d'ouvrage
hal-02196387v2
|
|
Simulations in Models of Preference AggregationŒconomia - History/Methodology/Philosophy, 2020, Simulations in Economics: Methodological and Historical Perspectives, 10 (2), pp.279-308. ⟨10.4000/oeconomia.8251⟩
Article dans une revue
hal-02424936v1
|
|
On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet PrincipleRevue d'économie politique, 2020, 130 (5), pp.699-726
Article dans une revue
hal-02147735v1
|
|
A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority ParadoxesEconomics Bulletin, 2018, 38 (4), pp. 1727-1736
Article dans une revue
hal-01896273v1
|